Mc 362 1 Nato Rules Of Engagement Pdf 🔘
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Mc 362 1 Nato Rules Of Engagement Pdf
in the longer term, putin seeks to use military force to reestablish the russian-speaking and russian-inhabited parts of ukraine. the previously existing autonomous regions in ukraine were an important part of russian foreign policy agenda. as such, putin has sought to use similar scenarios in crimea and eastern ukraine to enact this policy.83 given the bloody nature of previous efforts to restore these regions to russian control, moscow might be tempted to repeat such a scenario, thereby leaving the west with the decision of whether to use force or to accept russia s territorial claims. while this tactic would be perilous to the long-term stability of ukraine, russia might perceive the choice as an acceptable risk for better conditions in its near abroad. moreover, especially in the case of eastern ukraine, it might also be the easiest option. after all, moscow could simply grab the breakaway areas and move on, taking residents and their assets with it. nonetheless, in contrast to a military operation in crimea, capturing these areas would constitute a massive challenge in terms of logistics and military force.84
russia is traditionally involved in several large, multinational military exercises. in addition to the snap exercise in crimea, russia has also conducted several snap baltic exercises in 1995 and 2002, a snap exercise in the north atlantic ocean in 2005, and a multinational exercise in the black sea in 2007. although these exercises have generally been fairly routine, under current conditions, these exercises may have a wider impact on events in europe.81
the situation is different with respect to inf treaty violations. as the u.s. nuclear strategy doctrinal document emphasizes, nuclear weapons are designed to deter attacks by the principal nuclear states. the u. nuclear strategy also states that deterrence is largely dependent on the credibility of the u. nuclear deterrent. thus, the united states will be more concerned with deterring a potential first strike from a nuclear-armed soviet union than from russia, which did not develop nuclear weapons until 1984. however, the idea that the united states would use nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional russian attack that it could not prevent is less clear. thus, the u. nuclear deterrence doctrine implies that the united states would use nuclear weapons to defend western allies against a russian attack. this leaves the door open for the possibility that washington might consider using nuclear weapons to protect the baltic states or other friendly countries. however, a nuclear response option has been legally constrained in many ways and raises questions about the future of u. nuclear deterrence.
the recent confrontation between russia and nato over the georgia war in 2008 and the more recent incursions and tests by russia in the baltic states have provided an object lesson in the need for natos continued ability to deter aggression. the evolving security environment in europeand the apparent preferences of some nato allies for non-nuclear solutions to the security problems in the baltic region have also raised questions about natos ability to deter further russian aggression. natos argument that deterrence is possible despite its nuclear-constrained strategy lies in part on its ability to prevent escalation to a higher level of conflict and to coerce moscow into recognizing that it cannot win.26